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Richard A. Posnert
I have been asked to discuss alternatives to existing methods
of judicial dispute resolution. The great interest in such alterna-
tives reflects the widespread sense, which I share,1 that our courts
are dangerously overloaded. I had originally planned to discuss a
variety of alternatives, but as I explored the literature 2 I became
fascinated with the summary jury trial, and realized it was a sub-
ject worthy of an entire paper. But much of what I shall say about
the summary jury trial applies to other alternatives as well, so that
the paper is not quite so narrow as it may seem; and Part III dis-
cusses two of those alternatives.
I. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
The criteria for evaluating proposed alternatives to the con-
ventional methods of resolving legal disputes are mostly taken for
t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School. This is a revised version of a paper given at the National Con-
ference on Litigation Management at Yale Law School on October 4, 1985. The research
assistance of Randal C. Picker is gratefully acknowledged, as are the comments of Picker,
Albert Alschuler, Gregory Barton, Hugh Brenneman, Edward Brunet, Frank Easterbrook,
E. Donald Elliott, Jerry Goldman, William Landes, John Langbein, Geoffrey Miller, Phil
Neal, Anthony Partridge, Maurice Rosenberg, and Hans Zeisel on a previous draft of this
paper; discussions of the subject-matter of the paper with Susan Getzendanner and Thomas
Lambros; and comments of conference participants.
1 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM pt. 11 (1985).
See, e.g., ELIZABETH ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: A POLI-
CYMAKER'S GUIDE (Rand Inst. for Civ. Justice 1984); ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF
LITIGATION, Special Issue on Judicial ADR, 1985, passim (Center for Public Resources publi-
cation); ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS
(Am. Bar Ass'n 1984); Symposium: Alternative Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1219
(1984); Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdic-
tional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 893; McMillan & Siegel, Creating a
Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 431 (1985); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The
Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Costs
of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985).
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granted. That is because those making the proposals are practical
rather than theoretical men, and most practical men think they
can tell at a glance whether something works, and if it does they
pronounce it successful. I, however, a prisoner of my academic
past, propose four stringent criteria for evaluating any procedural
reform:
1. The procedure must conform to a model of rational liti-
gant behavior. Although emotion and ignorance play a role in liti-
gation, no proposed alternative is likely to work that assumes, im-
plicitly or explicitly, that litigants and their lawyers are irrational.
Rationality is the dominant although not the only characteristic of
behavior in established institutional frameworks administered by
professionals, such as that provided by the rules of federal trial
procedure. I won't attempt to defend this premise in its full
breadth but will note later some empirical support for the rational
model of litigant behavior.3
2. The success or failure of the procedure must be verifiable
by accepted methods of (social) scientific hypothesis testing. I am
unconvinced by anecdotes, glowing testimonials, confident asser-
tions, appeals to intuition. Lawyers, including judges and law
professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which
in honesty we should admit are often little better than
prejudices-to systematic empirical testing. Judicial opinions and
law review articles alike are full of assertions-about the effects of
a comparative negligence standard, jurors' comprehension of in-
structions, the consequences of keeping religion out of (or putting
it into) the public schools, the knowledgeability of consumers, the
legal sophistication of prisoners, the social utility of pretrial dis-
covery, the virtues of adversarial compared to inquisitorial tech-
niques, and hundreds of other matters-that have no demonstra-
ble factual basis. Not that the authors of these articles and
opinions must be wrong on any of these assertions; they may be
right on all. But they have only impressions; they have no verified
knowledge. If we are to experiment with alternatives to trials, let
us really experiment; let us propose testable hypotheses, and test
them.4
1 On rational theories of human behavior generally see, for example, GARY S. BECKER,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976), and on their application to law see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE ch. 1 (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 1-2 (3d ed. 1986).
4 On the application of social science methodology to law see, for example, Stigler, The
Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1972);
Zeisel, Reflections on Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1973),
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3. Any alternative to the trial must respect relevant legal
and institutional constraints, including those derived from the
separation of powers in our constitutional system. This may seem
a boring truism, but we shall see that there is a possibility that it is
being contravened not only by the summary jury trial but by
court-annexed arbitration.
4. Any proposed reform must move the legal system in the
right direction, where "right" is defined in accordance with broad
social policy rather than narrow craft standards of success. A pro-
posal that reduced the cost of using the courts might, by increasing
that use, disserve fundamental social interests-while serving all
too well the legal profession's narrow self-interest.
II. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
The summary jury trial was conceived by federal district judge
Thomas Lambros.5 Although I shall raise questions about it, noth-
ing I say should be taken as criticism of Judge Lambros, whose
imagination has energized the field of procedural reform and given
this paper its main subject.
A. Description
After pretrial discovery is completed and a pretrial conference
held, a jury case that seems unlikely to settle on the eve of trial (as
so many cases do) will be set for summary jury trial before a dis-
and, with specific reference to judicial administration, THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (P.
DuBois ed. 1982); R. PosNE, supra note 1, pt. II, and studies cited therein; and the Landes
and Danzon & Lillard studies cited infra note 7. For an exemplary controlled experiment on
the efficacy of a procedural reform, see MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND
EFFECTIVE JUsTIC&- A CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION (1964).
The empirical study of law is handicapped by the methods and organization of legal
education, which are inhospitable to the methods and practitioners of social science. See R.
POSER, supra note 1, at 326-30. The characteristic hostility of law-trained persons for ex-
perimental studies of law is illustrated by EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (Fed. Ju-
dicial Center, Sept. 1981).
5 See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 463 (1984). The appendices to Judge Lambros's report contain
full descriptions of the procedure, including verdict forms and implementing local court
rules. Id. at 480-518; see also M.-D. JACOUBovrrcH & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO (Fed. Judicial Center, May 1982). For briefer treatments
of the summary jury trial see Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 43 (1980); Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 1363, 1373-78 (1984), and for examples of the summary jury trial in action see Negin v.
City of Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Rocco Wine Distribs., Inc. v.
Pleasant Valley Wine Co., 596 F. Supp. 617, 621 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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trict judge or a magistrate. At the appointed time a jury is em-
paneled in much the usual manner, although in a summary jury
trial the lawyers are not allowed as many challenges. The jurors are
told it will be a summary jury trial but not-not yet anyway-that
their decision will have no binding effect.6 The lawyers then pre-
sent summaries of witness testimony plus their own argument. No
live witnesses are called, but in summarizing the testimony that
the witnesses would give if called the lawyers may not contradict
any facts stipulated to or otherwise established in pretrial discov-
ery. The jury is charged and deliberates, and returns a verdict in
the usual way. The lawyers and their clients-for the parties them-
selves are required to attend the summary jury trial, the hope be-
ing that this will encourage settlement-can then talk to the ju-
rors. The trial is intended to take the better part of a day,
although I have been told of one that lasted six days.
The idea behind the summary jury trial is to facilitate settle-
ment by giving parties and counsel a sense of how a jury is likely to
evaluate their case. The verdict is in no way binding, and the par-
ties can have a regular jury trial if they wish. But the summary
jury trial is not voluntary; it is a compulsory part of the pretrial
phase of the lawsuit, like a pretrial conference.
B. Evaluation
1. The Requirement of Rational Behavior. The summary
jury trial does not flout my first criterion of evaluation; it does not
rest on an assumption that litigants or their lawyers behave irra-
tionally. If this seems rather a backhanded way of putting it, you
will soon see why.
a. The Model of Settlement. Economists and economics-
minded lawyers have modeled litigants' choice of whether to try or
settle a case.7 The model predicts that the parties will settle if the
plaintiff's minimum settlement price (demand) is less than the de-
fendant's maximum settlement price (offer), or in symbols if
PpJ- C + S < PdJ + C-S, (1)
' The practice on when, if ever, the jury is told its true function is not uniform. See
infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, § 21.5, at 522-25; Landes, An Economic Analysis
of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61 (1971); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
55 (1982). Landes's article presents some empirical evidence supporting the economic model
of litigation behavior, as does Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1983).
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or, equivalently, if
(PP - Pd)J < 2(C - S). (2)
PP is the probability of the plaintiff's victory as the plaintiff per-
ceives it; P the probability of the plaintiff's victory as the defend-
ant perceives it; J the judgment for the plaintiff if he wins; C the
cost of trial (assumed to be the same for both parties); and S the
cost of settlement (also assumed to be the same for both parties).
The left side of inequality (1) is the plaintiff's minimum demand;
the right side is the defendant's maximum offer."
Admittedly the model is oversimplified. For example, it as-
sumes that the parties' litigation and settlement costs are the
same, that there are only two possible outcomes, J and judgment
for defendant (i.e., J and zero), and that the parties agree on the
value of J, though they may disagree about the probability that
the plaintiff will win. But the complications one might introduce to
make the model more realistic would not greatly affect the use I
shall make of it; I shall illustrate this point in a moment.
Since we can assume that a trial costs more than a settlement,
the value of P, - Pd, the parenthetical term on the left side of
inequality (2), is critical. If both parties are pessimistic, the paren-
thetical will be negative and the case will be settled. If, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff thought he had only a .4 chance of winning but
the defendant thought the plaintiff had a .7 chance of winning,
both parties would want to settle because both would expect to
lose if the case went to trial. Trial is more likely in the class of
cases where both parties are optimistic, as where the plaintiff
thinks he has a .9 chance of winning and the defendant thinks the
plaintiff has only a .3 chance of winning. For example, given these
probabilities, and assuming J=$10,000, C=$2,000, and S=$500,
the parties will litigate, since the plaintiff's minimum settlement
price, $7,500, exceeds the defendant's maximum settlement offer,
J Pp is the expected judgment to the plaintiff if he goes to trial, but is not his mini-
mum settling price. His minimum settling price, or minimum demand, is the net expected
benefit to him of going to trial, and so is lower than Pp J by the difference between the
plaintiff's trial and settlement costs (i.e., by C - S), since he will lose that difference if he
goes to trial. Therefore the plaintiff's minimum demand is Pp J - (C - S) = Pp J - C +
S, the left side of inequality (1).
For the defendant, the excess of trial over settlement costs (C - S again), being an
additional expected loss from trial, must be added to his estimate of the plaintiff's expected
judgment (Pd J) in determining a maximum settlement offer, i.e., the net amount the de-
fendant expects to lose if the case is tried. Hence the defendant's maximum offer is Pd J +
C - S, the right side of inequality (1).
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$4,500. Anything that reduces the gap in perceived probabilities
will make settlement more likely unless it changes some other ele-
ment in the model.
Professor Schuck's conference paper, which criticizes the set-
tlement model that I have just sketched,9 is actually a case study
in the application of the model. The costs of settlement (S) in the
case he discusses were very high because of the large number of
parties. Other things being equal, a high S will reduce the likeli-
hood of a settlement (see inequality (2)). The district judge is de-
picted in Schuck's paper as reducing S by injecting himself into
the settlement process and by appointing settlement masters to as-
sist in the negotiations. At the same time, the judge increased the
costs of trial, C (and with it the likelihood of settlement), by set-
ting a very near trial date. Finally, he increased the convergence of
the parties' estimates of the probable outcome at trial (i.e., re-
duced P, - Pd) in two ways: (1) by indicating to the parties how
he might rule on critical issues, and (2) by encouraging candid ex-
change of the parties' own estimates through the medium of the
settlement masters.10
b. The Model Applied to the Summary Jury Trial. The sum-
mary jury trial reduces the gap between the parties' perceived
probabilities of the outcome at trial by giving them information (in
the form of the summary jury's reactions to the case) that should
cause them to adjust their perceptions. Because the information is
available to both parties, it should help each to get closer to the
true odds, which will usually be somewhere in between the parties'
estimates. The summary jury trial may also help the parties con-
verge in their estimates of the size of the judgment if the case goes
to trial. Although my formal model assumed away any possible di-
vergence in these estimates, it is of course very common for the
plaintiff not only to be more optimistic about the outcome than
the defendant thinks warranted, but to expect a larger judgment
(if judgment is for the plaintiff) than the defendant expects to lose.
Narrowing this divergence will make a settlement more likely.
I Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 337, 339-40, 353 (1986).
10 The lawyers for opposing parties in litigation are often unwilling to "level" with each
other, hoping to obtain tactical advantages from surprise. Apparently they were more forth-
coming with the settlement masters, who were not interested in obtaining tactical advan-
tages for their clients since their only client was the judge. The literature on game theory
provides support for the use of such mediators to promote the settlement of disputes. See
ROGER B. MYERSON, ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES IN DISPUrE RESOLUTION (Northwestern U. Grad-
uate Sch. of Mgmt., Oct. 1985).
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True, the parties could always arrange for a mock summary
jury trial on their own-in much the same way that lawyers pre-
paring for jury trials in big cases will sometimes hire mock juries to
hone their forensic skills on. But real and mock summary jury trial
would differ in two respects. First, while a mock jury is a mock
jury, the jury in a summary jury trial is a real jury which (usually)
doesn't know until too late, as it were, that it is rendering a merely
advisory verdict. Every jury-trial lawyer and judge knows (or
thinks he knows) that jurors take seriously the reiterated admoni-
tions that they are deciding a matter of consequence and endeavor
conscientiously to discharge this duty of citizenship. But about the
conscientiousness of mock juries and therefore their comparability
to real juries there is a nagging doubt.11
Another difference between the mock jury and the summary
jury is that the government pays the latter (at the same rate as
regular federal jurors) and, with its power of conscription, pays
what for many of them is a below-market wage. Thus the saving to
the litigants from not having to pay for this settlement aid at mar-
ket rates is even greater than the government's actual budgetary
cost. 2 Can a public subsidy of the settlement process be justified?
In this age of swollen caseloads, maybe it can be. The benefits of
settlement go not only to the parties but to other users of the court
system, who face shorter queues and less harried judges as the set-
tlement rate rises. Since parties who settle create external benefits,
maybe they should be allowed to create some offsetting external
costs, too;'3 maybe that will bring us closer to the socially optimum
level of settlements. This is especially plausible because the gov-
ernment subsidizes litigation. Since the parties bear only a fraction
of the costs they impose on the judicial system and other litigants,
an offsetting or even greater subsidy to settlement may be
warranted.14
1 In R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY ch. 3 (1983), however,
the authors argue forcefully that experiments using mock juries can be made sufficiently
realistic to yield reliable predictions about the behavior of real juries.
2 This is a private rather than social saving. The real costs of the jury are no lower
than if jurors were paid a market wage, but with conscription much of the cost is borne by
the jurors themselves.
13 This is a standard technique in law. See, for example, the doctrines of "public neces-
sity" and of "economic loss" in tort law, discussed in RIcHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 186-87, 467-68 (1982).
14 The existence of a positive externality may also explain why the summary jury trial
must be compulsory, instead of the parties' being allowed to decide whether to have one.
The private costs of this technique might exceed its private benefits and yet be lower than
the social benefits. Also, judges who use summary jury trials may not fully trust lawyers to
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The noncommittal manner in which I have put the case for
subsidizing settlement is deliberate. Settling a case may also re-
quire an expenditure of judicial resources; the summary jury trial
itself illustrates this point. Reducing (by subsidizing) the litigants'
costs of settling cases might, by reducing the cost of resorting to
the courts in the first place, actually increase the total costs of the
system, even if the settlement rate rose. I shall come back to this
issue later.
Moreover, although the summary jury trial does seem likely to
reduce the uncertainty that the economic model (as well as com-
mon sense) predicts is a big factor in the decision to try rather
than settle a case, it does not follow that the settlement rate will
rise. Uncertainty is not the only variable in the model. The sum-
mary jury trial may also alter trial costs and (as already suggested)
settlement costs, and in the model the difference between the two
(C - S) is also critical to the decision whether to go to trial.
The direction in which summary jury trial alters trial and set-
tlement costs, however, is a question of some difficulty. If one eval-
uates these costs as of the end of the procedure, then it seems that
summary jury trial reduces both types of cost, though probably
only slightly. It reduces litigation costs by giving the parties a real-
istic and partly government-financed rehearsal that substitutes for
a part of their trial preparation. It reduces settlement costs by pro-
viding a forum, again partly government-financed, for settlement
negotiations. It does these things because, as we have seen, it is a
free (and superior) substitute for information the costs of which
would have been borne entirely by the parties.15 If trial and settle-
ment costs are reduced by the same percentage, the absolute dif-
ference between them must shrink; for example, if C falls by 25
percent, from $1,000 to $750, and S also by 25 percent but from
$600 to $450, the difference between C and S will fall from $400 to
$300. Therefore the likelihood of trial must increase. This effect
would have to be balanced against that of increasing the conver-
gence of the parties' estimates of their chances at trial.
But the end of the summary jury trial is not the right point at
which to measure trial and settlement costs. The right point is
whenever settlement negotiations do or could occur. And until the
summary jury trial takes place, its cost to the parties enters into
their decision calculus as a cost of continuing to litigate rather
be the loyal and effective agents of their clients.
15 Setting to one side other forms of judicial involvement in settlement. See, e.g., supra
text accompanying note 9.
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than settling before the summary jury trial. Hence C will increase
relative to S and make settlement more likely, quite apart from
(and in addition to) the fact that the probability of settlement will
rise because uncertainty about the outcome at trial is reduced and
C and S are (by assumption) unchanged.
Hence the summary jury trial should, as its advocates contend,
increase the likelihood of settlement,"8 though the effect may not
be great because the reduction in uncertainty brought about by the
summary jury trial may not be great:
(1) The jury's principal function is to determine the credibil-
ity of witnesses, yet there are no witnesses in the summary jury
trial. The credibility assessed is that of the lawyers. A jury may
react quite differently when confronted with the actual witnesses.
We do not need a jury of laymen to decide which of two lawyers is
more credible.
(2) If there is substantial variance in verdicts among differ-
ent juries deciding the same case, the verdict in the summary jury
trial will convey only limited information about the likely verdict
of the real jury that will hear the case if the parties do not settle;
so the gap between P, and Pd will shrink only slightly.
(3) As lawyers become more experienced in conducting sum-
mary jury trials, we may see more "strategizing"-lawyers holding
back some of their best evidence or arguments in an effort to sur-
prise the opponent at the real trial, should the summary jury trial
not lead to settlement.
Maybe a summary bench trial, which would avoid problems
(1) and (2) as well as some of the legal problems discussed later,
deserves consideration as an alternative device for facilitating
settlement.
2. Verifiability of Effects. My second criterion for a proposed
alternative to the conventional trial was that its effects be verifia-
ble. This ideally would require that cases be assigned randomly for
summary jury trial, with other cases receiving the usual treatment.
And by random, I mean random; I mean by use of a table of ran-
dom numbers. Then the summary jury trial cases could be com-
pared with a proper control group and, provided there were enough
cases in each group to allow statistical comparison, we would know
whether there were any differences and, if so, what they were. 17
16 Increase it over what? is a very important question, however, to which I shall return.
See infra text accompanying note 23.
17 For noteworthy examples of the statistical study of a procedural device see Rosen-
berg's 1964 study of pretrial conferences, supra note 4, and Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials
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The qualification is critical, since if there are only a few cases in
each group we can have no assurance that the groups are compara-
ble. But it would not be difficult to obtain a large enough sample.
There are more than 14,000 civil trials in the federal courts each
year,"' and a much larger number of cases that are set for trial,
since many cases settle on the eve of trial. If for just one or two
years one percent of the cases ready for trial were assigned ran-
domly for summary jury trial, we would have an adequate sample
for purposes of statistical study.
No such study has been attempted. Judges who like the idea
of the summary jury trial use it in cases they think will benefit
from it. Neither the presiding judge nor the case is chosen ran-
domly. So the fact that many judges who use the summary jury
trial are enthusiastic about it may tell us little about its
effectiveness.
A simpler but inferior alternative to a randomized study
would be for judges conducting summary jury trials to record cer-
tain information: (1) the parties' estimates of how long the real
trial would take, (2) the length of the summary jury trial, (3)
whether the case was settled or, if not, (4) the length of the real
trial. The problem with this method is that the cases settled after
summary jury trial might have been settled by another, maybe
cheaper, form of judicial intervention. (In contrast, if a control
group were used, the effectiveness of any settlement devices used
in lieu of summary jury trials would be tested automatically.) Nev-
ertheless the method would at least yield information on the maxi-
mum benefits realistically to be expected from the use of summary
jury trials.
A third possibility would be to require the lawyers in a sum-
mary jury trial to submit anonymous evaluations of the procedure
to the Federal Judicial Center. Anonymity would prevent the law-
yers from trying to curry favor with the judge by praising the pro-
cedure (chosen by the judge) or its implementation (by the judge).
If the plaintiff's and the defendant's lawyers disagree in their eval-
uation, I would be inclined to discard it; winning or losing a case
can distort perceptions severely. But if both lawyers concur in ei-
and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HAmv. L. REv. 1606 (1963). The dates of these
two studies show that the statistical study of legal procedure is not just a fad of the 1980s.
And, of course, such studies have long been standard in the evaluation of new medical
procedures.
" See ADMINISTRATxIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREc-
TOR table C8.
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ther a positive or negative evaluation, I would consider it pretty
reliable. 19
The failure to use scientific methods to evaluate the summary
jury trial can be compared instructively with the method being
used to evaluate the experimental federal prison at Butner, North
Carolina, a prison designed (penologically, not architecturally) by
my distinguished academic colleague, Norval Morris. Butner is a
prison largely without bars. Prisoners live in unlocked rooms
rather than cells and are allowed to wear their street clothes.
Guards do not wear uniforms. Thus, an effort is made to create as
noncoercive an atmosphere as possible, coupled, however, with the
insistence that the prisoners use their time productively.
If the people running Butner were allowed to choose the pris-
oners, the experiment would be pronounced an astonishing success.
Professor Morris was not interested in such facile triumphs, and
insisted that a certain number of prisoners be assigned randomly
and that their behavior in Butner and after release be compared
with a control group of inmates of other federal prisons.20 The ex-
periment has been going on for eight years and has revealed that
(1) Butner's alumni have the identical recidivism rate as the con-
trol group, but (2) the level of prison violence among Butner's in-
mates is only half that of the control group. These statistics pro-
vide a solid basis for pronouncing Butner a substantial though
limited success-though unfortunately the imitation by other fed-
eral prisons of some of the experimental features of Butner may
have contaminated the control group to some extent.
I anticipate the objection that lawsuits are less fungible than
prisoners. Whether true or not, this is not a valid objection to my
suggested procedure. If one picked 1,000 federal civil cases at ran-
dom, divided them randomly into two groups of 500 cases each,
used summary jury trial in each case in one group but in no case in
the other group, and then found that the settlement rates in the
two groups differed substantially, it would be hard to argue that
summary jury trial had made no difference. There would be many
differences among the cases in both groups, but with each group
being both large and randomly selected, all the differences but
19 In M.-D. JAcounovrrcH & C. MOORE, supra note 5, at 7-20, the authors present re-
sults of a questionnaire sent to lawyers who had participated in summary jury trials. The
responses were generally favorable to the device, but no effort was made to confine analysis
to cases in which both the plaintiff's and the defendant's lawyers concurred in the
evaluation.10 See NoRvAL MORRIS, THE FuTuRE OF IMPISONMENT 117-21 (1974).
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one-the use or nonuse of summary jury trials-would tend to can-
cel out, thus isolating the effect of summary jury trial.
In lieu of an experiment I have done some very crude number
crunching in an attempt to see whether the summary jury trial has
made any difference in Judge Lambros's own district, the Northern
District of Ohio. Using published statistics of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts for the five years before and the five years
since Judge Lambros introduced the device,2 1 I compared various
indicia of judicial performance in his district with the other district
in Ohio and with all other districts in Judge Lambros's circuit, the
Sixth Circuit (that is, with all Sixth Circuit districts except the
Northern District of Ohio).
Table 1
Active Summary Jury Trial Districts
District Number of SJT's By % of Cases
N.D. Ohio 100 1.80%
D. Mass. 69 1.49%
W.D. Mich. 36 1.39%
W.D. Okla. 13 0.40%
S.D. Ohio 10 0.16%
E.D. Penn. 7 0.10%
S.D. Fla. 5 0.09%
E.D. Mich. 3 0.04%
M.D. Penn. 3 0.15%
My study is admittedly very crude and, among other things,
ignores the fact that there are nine other judges in the Northern
District. Nevertheless, the device appears to be used much more
frequently there than in any other district in the Sixth Circuit. Ta-
ble 1 (compiled from correspondence with judges known or be-
lieved to have used the device), which estimates the number of
summary jury trials conducted since 1980, by district, shows that
the device is used ten times as often in the Northern as in the
Southern District of Ohio, and rarely, if ever, elsewhere in the
Sixth Circuit. Of course, even in the Northern District of Ohio it is
used in only a small number of cases, and this limits its possible
impact. But since trials are not all of the same length, a settlement
device that eliminated long trials (as summary jury trial is alleged
"' He introduced the device in March, 1980, shortly before the beginning of the 1981
judicial year on July 1, 1980.
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to do) might have effects disproportionate to the number of cases
in which it was used.
Table 2 summarizes the study's results. A simple comparison
of the number of trials might suggest dramatic improvements in
the Northern District. Civil trials in the Northern District declined
in number from 380 to 270, compared to a much smaller decline in
the Southern District and an increase for the circuit as a whole.
But as shown graphically in Figure 1, this decline began years
before the summary jury trial was introduced and leveled off after
its introduction-the opposite of what one would expect if the de-
vice raises the settlement rate. This is not conclusive evidence
against the efficacy of summary jury trials, since (among other
things) extraneous forces may have been pushing up the number of
trials and the summary jury trial may have held these forces in
check. A simple comparison with the trend in the number of trials
in non-Northern District (NND) districts (the top line in Figure 1)
would so suggest. But comparison with the Southern District (the
bottom line) suggests not.
Figure 1
Number of Trials
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Looking now to median disposition time, one finds no signifi-
cant trend, but again the Northern District's performance is not
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particularly impressive. In the five years before the summary jury
trial was introduced, the average time from filing to disposition of
a civil case in the Northern District was 6.4 months, compared to
7.8 months for the Southern District and 8.6 for the NND districts.
For the five "after" years the figures are 7.8, 7.6, and 8-higher for
the Northern District, lower for the Southern District and for the
NND districts.22 This is the opposite of what advocates of sum-
mary jury trials would predict.
The data on number of cases terminated and number of cases
pending provide further indicators of efficiency in the disposition
of judicial business. In the five "before" years, the Northern Dis-
trict terminated an average of 2,539 cases a year, compared to
2,016 for the Southern District and 10,541 for all NND districts.
The corresponding averages for the next five years are 4,509, 4,236,
and 20,802. In percentages the growth in terminations between the
two periods is 77.6 percent for the Northern District, 110.1 percent
for the Southern District, and 97.3 percent for all NND districts.
Once again the Northern District has lagged.
Let us see who is doing the best job in controlling caseloads.
The average number of pending cases grew (between the before
and after periods) by 78.4 percent in the Northern District, 94.2
percent in the Southern District, and 39.5 percent in the circuit as
a whole. The Northern District does better than the Southern in
this comparison but much worse than the NND districts as a
whole.
Table 3 refines the study by dividing the number of trials, ter-
minations, and pending cases by the number of judges in the re-
spective districts. The purpose is to correct for the single factor
most likely to affect these numbers. The results, however, do not
differ markedly from those in Table 2. Again there is a dramatic
reduction in number of trials in the Northern District, but most of
it is between 1977 and 1979, and since then the number has fallen
even faster in the Southern District, though not at all in the NND
districts as a whole.
In terminations per judge, the Northern District does better
relative to the comparison districts than it did in Table 2: its ter-
minations rose 53.5 percent between the before and after periods,
compared to 64.1 percent for the Southern District and 55.8 per-
cent for the NND districts. But in control of backlog the Northern
District does about the same, relatively, as in Table 2: the number
22 In this comparison only, results for the Northern District have not been subtracted
from results for all non-Northern districts, as I lack the data necessary for this adjustment.
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of pending cases in the Northern District rose 58 percent between
the two periods, compared to 50.9 percent for the Southern Dis-
trict and 9.7 percent for the NND districts.
To summarize, the study does not support a conclusion that
the summary jury trial increases judicial efficiency; but again the
crudeness of the study must be stressed. It does not show that the
summary jury trial is a failure but does highlight the uncertainty
that must attend an experiment in judicial reform that is not con-
ducted using scientific techniques that would enale the outcome
of the experiment to be evaluated objectively.
The results of the study, assuming they hold up under more
rigorous statistical analysis (which would attempt to control for
additional factors besides number of judges that may affect judicial
performance across districts), are not particularly surprising. For
compared to what should the summary jury trial be expected to
raise the settlement rate? Compared to utter judicial passivity?
That would not be a realistic benchmark. The summary jury trial
is one of many methods of encouraging settlements. Others include
a lengthier pretrial conference and more active judicial involve-
ment in the parties' settlement discussions.23 The judicial time
taken up in summary jury trials might be spent equally well or
even better on some other method of encouraging settlements, es-
pecially when one considers how lavish the summary jury trial is
with the judge's time: he spends a whole day trying to settle one
case.
We should keep in mind that settling more cases may make
litigation more attractive to other disputants by reducing the wait-
ing period for a trial. The total number of trials may not be af-
fected, though the data in Table 2 suggest that the summary jury
trial has not reduced the court queue. Another point is that the
device operates on only a small fraction of the total number of tri-
als, which in turn is only a small fraction of the total number of
cases. Judge Lambros conducts a summary jury trial in any case
that he thinks likely to require a jury trial of more than three days.
However, most judges set a higher threshold, recognizing that a
23 A recent survey found that most lawyers think that active judicial involvement in
settlement negotiations is the key to raising the settlement rate. See WAYNE BRAZIL, SET-
TLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEws ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES
FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (Am. Bar Ass'n 1985), summarized in Brazil, What Lawyers Want
From Judges in the Settlement Arena, 106 F.R.D. 85 (1985). Professor Schuck's conference
paper, supra note 9, is a case study of such involvement. Admittedly that involvement was
far more extensive than a summary jury trial would require; on the other hand the case was
gigantic.
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summary jury trial lasting a day could substantially increase the
total trial time for a case that fails to settle after the summary
stage.
In 1985, according to Table C8 in the Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, of 20,729
trials conducted in federal district courts 2,249 (10.9 percent) were
civil jury trials lasting at least four days. If summary jury trial re-
duced by 10 percent the number of lengthy civil jury trials, this
would only be a one percent reduction in the number of trials. The
reduction in the number of days of trial time would of course be
greater but would be partially offset by the days devoted to the
summary jury trial itself.
Table 4 tries to quantify the potential savings in trial time
from using summary jury trials. It first calculates the total number
of days that federal judges spend in civil or criminal trials from the
data published by the Administrative Office, and then it assumes
that (1) a summary jury trial is held in every civil jury trial that
(today) lasts four or more days; (2) it lasts one day except when
the actual trial lasts 30 days or more, in which event the average
summary jury trial is assumed to last three days, to constitute an
adequate microcosm of the full trial; and (3) for these very long
cases, the settlement rate after summary jury trial is only two-
thirds the settlement rate in cases with short trials (e.g., if the as-
sumed settlement rate for short trials were 90 percent, for long tri-
als it would be 60 percent). The reason for (3) is that a case that (if
tried) will require a very long trial is likely to be extremely com-
plex, making it less likely that any new settlement device will suc-
ceed when all other settlement devices have failed. For it must be
remembered that we are dealing with a class of cases that are in
fact tried, though if summary jury trial were universal they might
not be. Also, a long trial is more likely as the stakes in the case
increase. In the settlement model, raising the stakes (J) makes set-
tlement less likely.
On the basis of these assumptions, which are arbitrary but
plausible and not unfriendly to the summary jury trial,2 4 Table 4
shows that substantial time savings are obtained from making
summary jury trial universal only if the percentage of cases settled
by the device is very high, and even then the maximum savings in
" For example, I have not excluded cases in which summary jury trial is used and fails
to bring about a settlement, with the result that the case is tried. I assume that even some
of these cases would be settled by use of the summary jury trial if the device were universal.
1986]
384 The University of Chicago Law Review [53:366
o.C 40 1c~ - ' 00"t C >C
m~ 00t -4 O ioc0 m
4C iC6L t:t- 6 6C
0 4 0-4e -4- - 4-4- 4
0. W 0C oN - O0 >0
t- 1. 4 OD r C
rq- -4 0 -
.
0 W 02
*4) W bD 4)
p.'9-t
C> mCO t CO-4 C o"'r , 0
$4 CSt
Ol m o04 m -.)d. O
,a LO W m V--- - US-U6 -W cc ccc5
16 c60626 -: 6 0620202a
E-1 co.II.4 - - - ,4~4~C7
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trial time is only 20 percent.2 5 But the percentage of settlements is
unlikely to be very high, given that the universe is all those cases
not settled by any device today. Although judges using summary
jury trial report overwhelming success, they are not using the de-
vice all the time; they are using it in cases where they think it
likely to work. If they used it in all cases bound for trial, the suc-
cess rate would fall. Moreover, the only judges who use the device
today are those who believe in it and want to make it work; nonbe-
lievers forced to use it would have a lower success rate. This might
not be true if every district judge were persuaded to use it volunta-
rily, but that is unlikely to happen.
3. Legal and Prudential Constraints. My third criterion is
that any proposed alternative respect legal and prudential con-
straints on judicial power. Although Congress has empowered
lower federal courts to issue supplementary rules of procedure e2 I
am not sure it has authorized them to order summary jury trials.
Admittedly, federal judges have long had the power to convene ad-
visory juries. But the summary jury is not an advisory jury. It does
not advise the judge how to decide the case, but is used to push
the parties to settle. It is therefore outside the scope of rule 39(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with advisory
juries.2 7
I also can find nothing in rule 16 (pretrial conference) to sug-
gest that judges are authorized to convene juries to assist in settle-
ment. It is true that rule 16(c)(7) permits the participants in the
pretrial conference to "consider and take action with respect to
...the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial proce-
dures to resolve the dispute." But the Advisory Committee's note
to the 1983 amendment which added this subsection does not men-
tion summary jury trial or authorize any special procedures for en-
couraging settlement. All the subsection appears to require or au-
thorize, so far as is relevant here, is the discussion (not
implementation) at the pretrial conference of extrajudicial proce-
:5 The increase in the projected savings of trial time during the period of years in the
table reflects the fact that trials have been getting longer.
29 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
'1 Rule 39(c) allows the district court, "[i]n all actions not triable of right by a jury," to
"try any issue with an advisory jury." This would seem to exclude the summary jury trial,
which is used in actions triable of right by a jury. As the Advisory Committee's note ex-
plains, rule 39(c) codifies the traditional practice in equity, maritime law, and other nonjury
fields whereby the judge could if he wanted convene a jury to advise him on questions of
fact. See, e.g., Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240 (1893); In re Incident Aboard the D/B
Ocean King, 758 F.2d 1063, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1985); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2335 (1971).
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dures-which summary jury trial is not.
Of course not everything not expressly authorized by the fed-
eral rules is therefore forbidden to federal judges. But lack of clear
authority is a reason for hesitation in sensitive areas. Summary
jury trial is an enlargement of the use of the jury. Jury service is,
as noted earlier, a form of conscription; and conscription is not
popular in this country. Granted, if the summary jury trial is as
effective a settlement device as its advocates believe, it will reduce
the demand for jurors. But that is only a possibility, and in any
event judges should be cautious about instituting new forms of in-
voluntary servitude, mild as this one is. The fact that Congress ap-
propriates money for jurors without indicating how they are to be
used does not necessarily authorize novel forms of jury service. Nor
does anything in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,8
which governs the use of juries in federal courts, empower federal
judges to summon jurors to serve as mediators.
An important issue is what the jury in a summary jury trial is
told, and when. Some judges tell the jury at the outset that its
verdict will only be advisory-which is likely to reduce the ver-
dict's informational value; other judges tell the jury after it has
rendered its verdict; some never tell it. 29 Never telling the jury
worries me. The jury, especially in commercial litigation, is a curi-
ous institution-a vestige, many believe, of a previous epoch in le-
gal evolution. If it works at all, this may be because jurors are im-
pressed by being told that they are exercising governmental power.
That makes them act more responsibly than one might have
thought likely given the nature of the selection process and the
lack of incentives for jurors to perform well. (The same, by the
way, can and should be said about judges.) If word got around that
some jurors are being fooled into thinking they are deciding cases
when they are not, it could undermine the jury system.30
Telling the jurors after they have delivered the summary ver-
dict that the verdict is not legally binding is only a partial anodyne
for my concern. (Telling them in advance eliminates the principal
advantage of the summary jury trial over a mock proceeding,
28 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1877 (1982).
11 See Recent Development-Procedure: Summary Jury Trials in United States Dis-
trict Court, Western District of Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 214, 217 n.16 (1984).
80 Some social scientists believe, see, e.g., R. HASTiE, S. PENRoD & N. PENNINGTON,
supra note 11, ch. 3, that they can get mock juries to perform pretty much as real ones do;
and mock jurors know they are not exercising real power. But the social scientists have tools
for selecting and motivating jurors that are denied to the court system; they have greater
flexibility in selection and compensation.
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where the lawyers hire people off the street to be the jurors. Thus,
advance notice calls in question the entire rationale of the device.)
The jurors are still being fooled; and they are learning that juries
sometimes make decisions and at other times simply referee fake
trials. As word spreads, the conscientiousness of jurors could de-
cline; it is almost a detail that the utility of the summary jury trial
would also decline.
These reflections lead me to wonder, again, why we don't see
proposals for summary bench trials. The answer may be that since
the average bench trial in the federal system is only half the length
of the average jury trial, 1 the potential benefits of settlement are
smaller.
There is some (though I think tenuous) basis for worrying that
summary jury trials might coerce settlements by large corporate
defendants. Suppose a corporation is sued for several million dol-
lars and a summary jury trial results in a verdict of $10 million. No
longer can the corporation pretend that the lawsuit has no possible
merit and that it exposes the corporation to no appreciable danger
of financial loss. A verdict that is substantial relative to the firm's
earnings or assets may be deemed material information that must
be disclosed to the shareholders in order to avoid a charge of secur-
ities fraud. Such disclosure could be a costly sanction, and would
put great pressure on the firm to settle rather than tough it out till
the real trial, which may be many months later. In this setting the
summary trial becomes the real trial rather than just an aid to set-
tlement. It is a very cheap real trial and that is all to the good, but
it may also be an unreliable method of adjudicating a substantial
dispute.
I put little weight on this argument, however. If the stock mar-
ket is efficient, as the evidence indicates, 2 the market impact of
disclosure of an adverse summary jury trial verdict will be buffered
by awareness that the verdict may not accurately predict the re-
sults of a real trial. If it is a good predictor, disclosure will-as it
should-affect the market's valuation of the firm.
4. Benefit to Society. My last criterion for a proposed alter-
native to the conventional trial is that it move us in the right di-
rection. Supposing that with the summary jury trial a higher frac-
tion of cases is settled (at this moment a highly uncertain
prediction), is this a good thing from the standpoint of society as a
3' See R. PosNmR, supra note 1, at 130 n.1.
3' See, e.g., J. LORm & M HAMILTON, THE STOCK M.AK. THSoioEs AND EVIDENCE ch.
4 (1973).
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whole? It benefits the parties to cases that would otherwise have
been tried (at least if coerced settlement is not a serious problem),
because settlement is cheaper than trial. But is it a good or a bad
thing for the rest of society?
The object of policy, even narrowly conceived, is not to maxi-
mize the settlement rate; it is to minimize the total costs of the
system of dispute resolution. These include costs of legal error as
well as the direct costs, to the parties and the judicial system, of
dispute resolution.3" Raising the settlement rate will reduce the di-
rect costs, in the short run, because litigation is more costly than
settlement. But in the long run the litigation rate may rise. With
few suits being tried and therefore few decisions being made, par-
ties will find it difficult to predict how courts will resolve their dis-
putes. P, and .d in the formal model of settlement will increasingly
diverge, and cases will be litigated that would be settled if parties
had better information about how their cases would be decided if
they went to trial. Raising the settlement rate may also, as sug-
gested earlier, increase the number of cases filed, by lowering the
expected cost of litigating (which includes settlement, the termi-
nating event of most lawsuits); if so, the total costs of resolving
disputes may rise even if the average cost falls because more cases
are settled.
But actually the summary jury trial is unlikely to affect the
settlement rate even if, as I have been assuming, it increases the
probability of settling each and every case subjected to the device.
Judges have only so much time to devote to civil trials, given the
pressure of their other responsibilities, in particular the pressure
that the Speedy Trial Act exerts to give priority to criminal trials.
Faced as most federal district judges are with many more cases
filed in a year (more than 500 in the busier districts) than they can
try (perhaps 40 on average, of which almost half would be criminal
cases), they must, to equilibrate supply and demand, delay trials,
refer disputes to magistrates, and put pressure on the parties to
settle. If the summary jury trial settles some cases that would oth-
erwise be tried, other cases will advance in the queue; or the judge
will put less pressure on the parties to those cases to settle; or
33 This is a conventional economic formulation of the goal of procedure, see, e.g., Pos-
ner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 401 (1973), and in a slightly different form was used by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), as the test for whether specific procedures
provide due process of law.
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fewer cases will be referred to magistrates.34 Whatever happens,
there will be the same number of trials. The summary jury trial is
a substitute not for real trials but for alternative methods of push-
ing the parties to settle, and it is a costly substitute.
Of course, for those who believe the federal courts are being
underutilized, any procedure that has a fair chance of raising the
settlement rate in these courts, thereby making room for new
cases, will be welcome. That is not my view, though it would take
me too far afield to show why the federal courts have too much
rather than too little business; it is not the view of the advocates of
summary jury trial, either. They accept, regretfully or resignedly,
rather than welcome, the prospect of an ever-expanding federal
caseload. They merely hope to process cases more rapidly by re-
ducing the fraction of cases that are tried. They are like highway
engineers, for whom the natural solution to highway congestion is
to build more and wider highways. The advocates of more efficient
machinery for expediting case flow have not shown equivalent in-
terest in measures to reduce the overall demand for federal judicial
services, as by raising the jurisdictional minimum amount in con-
troversy in diversity cases, or raising filing fees above their present
ridiculously low levels, or returning some legal responsibilities to
state courts. It is in those directions, I believe, that the only lasting
reforms lie.3 5 It is merely a detail that the summary jury trial, de-
spite the enthusiasm it has generated, remains problematic even
on its own rather too limited terms of reference.
III. SoME EXTENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
A. Court-Annexed Arbitration
My analytic framework can be applied to other alternatives to
the conventional trial besides summary jury trials, and I want to
mention two. One is "court-annexed arbitration," 38 which means
forcing the parties to present their case to a private lawyer-arbitra-
tor (sometimes a panel of arbitrators) before they can go to trial.
As with the summary jury trial, the arbitrator's decision is not
binding; the hope is that it will encourage settlement.
This device avoids the problems of using the jury as a settle-
" This is especially true since some proponents of the summary jury trial envisage that
most of these trials will be conducted by magistrates rather than judges.
3 See R. PosNER. supra note 1, pts. II-Ill.
38 On this and other proposals see the authorities cited supra at note 2; see also E.
LIND & J. SHEPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL Dis-
TRICT COURTS (Fed. Judicial Center, Sept. 1983).
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ment aid. Since arbitrators are less representative of jurors than
summary jurors are, it might seem obvious that arbitrators' deci-
sions would produce less information about likely outcomes at
trial, and hence fewer settlements, than a summary jury trial
would do. But depending on the variance among juries, an arbitra-
tor who is an experienced trial lawyer may render a decision more
representative of what the average jury would come up with than
the decision of any single jury. And of course the device is usable
in bench as well as jury trials, as the summary jury trial is not.
The biggest objections to court-annexed arbitration involve
expense and legality. The expense is apt to be greater than that of
the summary jury trial for two reasons. First, although arbitration
is less expensive than an ordinary federal trial, it is more expensive
than the average settlement negotiation. It involves a trial, albeit
to an arbitrator rather than a judge or jury. This means that wit-
nesses must be prepared and examined and that lawyers must
spend time in court, for which they usually charge higher fees than
for out-of-court work. The summary jury trial is also a sort of trial,
but no witnesses actually testify; and it is a last-ditch effort to set-
tle a case that seems bound for trial, rather than a required step in
every case. Court-annexed arbitration is ordered in every case that
meets certain requirements as to amount in controversy, even
though most of those cases would have been settled without court-
annexed arbitration.
The cost savings from court-annexed arbitration are specula-
tive. An example will show how the device could actually increase
the cost of resolving legal disputes-and do so even if it is much
cheaper than trial and even if all cases subjected to it settle after
the arbitrator's decision. Suppose that without court-annexed arbi-
tration 90 out of 100 cases filed would settle, at an average settle-
ment cost of $1,000 (not the amount of the settlement, but the
expense of effecting settlement), and the other 10 would go to trial,
at an average cost of $25,000. With court-annexed arbitration, all
settle, but at an average cost (the cost of the arbitration) of $5,000.
The total litigation and settlement costs without court-annexed ar-
bitration are $340,000, while the total costs with it (all settlement
costs) are $500,000. If 5 percent of the arbitrated cases are tried,
which would be half the litigation rate without court-annexed arbi-
tration,37 the total costs of court-annexed arbitration in my exam-
ple rise from $500,000 to $625,000, which is almost twice the cost
37 Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 810, estimate that court-annexed arbitration in
the Third Circuit has cut the litigation rate there by a little more than one half.
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without the device. This comparison is somewhat unfair because it
ignores the cases that settle before the arbitration hearing; but
even if most do, the total costs of dispute resolution may not be
lower with court-annexed arbitration. If, for example, 60 percent of
the cases settle before the arbitration hearing (at a settlement cost
of $1,000 per case), 35 percent are settled after the hearing, and 5
percent are tried, the total costs will be $385,000, which again ex-
ceeds (though by a smaller margin) the total costs without court-
annexed arbitration ($340,000).
The problem of legality is twofold. First, if a party to court-
annexed arbitration refuses to settle after arbitration, and then
does worse at trial, he must pay the arbitrator's fee, which will
usually be several hundred dollars. In effect this is a fee for de-
manding a trial. But Congress has set no such fee.
Second, court-annexed arbitration effectively increases the
statutory minimum amount in controversy. Such arbitration usu-
ally is compulsory only for claims that do not exceed a specified
monetary value, most commonly $100,000. The thinking behind
the limit is that with modest claims the parties will not think it
worthwhile to incur the costs of two procedures-the arbitration,
and then the trial-while with larger claims the parties are un-
likely to accept the arbitration as binding. Apparently the combi-
nation of having to pay the arbitrator's fee if you reject his award
and of having to pay the usual trial expenses for both the arbitra-
tion and the trial is a potent disincentive to insisting on a trial of a
modest claim in districts that have court-annexed arbitration.
This seems an indirect method of increasing the minimum
amount in controversy requirement in the federal courts from zero
for virtually all federal claims, and from $10,000 for claims
founded on diversity, to wherever the cut-off point for court-an-
nexed arbitration is fixed. This cuts against the grain of Congress's
decision, wise or not, to make federal courts accessible to smaller
claims.
Although I have reservations about court-annexed arbitration,
I am pleased to note that the Private Adjudication Center of Duke
Law School, which operates a court-annexed arbitration program
for the Middle District of North Carolina, is using random assign-
ment in order to enable a rigorous statistical evaluation of the pro-
gram,38 and I am told that random assignment will also be used in
the District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of New York.
33 See Duke's Private Adjudication Center, DuKE's L. MAG., Summer 1985, at 27, 30.
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B. Private "ADR"
The other proposal I shall touch on, much too briefly, is the
proposal to encourage voluntary alternative dispute resolution by
commercial services, often offered by law firms. It is not obvious
why this needs government encouragement, but an argument can
be made, along the lines suggested earlier, that if settlement con-
fers external benefits the government should subsidize the settle-
ment process.
A practical problem, and perhaps one that will come to haunt
court-annexed arbitration also, is that private attorneys may dis-
like submitting their disputes to other private attorneys, who in
the nature of things are potential competitors for their clients. The
client may wonder why he is hiring a lawyer to argue before an-
other lawyer, rather than hiring the second lawyer directly to re-
ceive authoritative legal advice.
Private "ADR," being voluntary, is much less problematic
than either the summary jury trial or court-annexed arbitration.
And it consumes no judicial resources (or very few-occasionally,
as with ordinary arbitration, judicial enforcement of the arbitra-
tion award may be sought). I wish it all the best, though I think its
potential is limited, if only because, as suggested earlier, it is not
clear whether the overall settlement rate can actually be raised.
IV. CONCLUSION
The three proposals discussed in this paper have much in
common. They seek to induce more settlements, and to do so by
generating more information about the likely outcome at trial.
They thus recognize implicitly both that litigants generally behave
rationally and that, given current judicial caseloads, a higher set-
tlement rate would benefit litigants in general and not just the par-
ties to the settlement. I am sympathetic to both propositions (es-
pecially the first), but as already suggested by the analogy of
highway construction I am not persuaded that making settlement
cheaper to the parties is the solution to the caseload crisis. I would
prefer to make the parties bear a larger fraction of the total costs
of trial, including the queueing costs that trials impose on other
parties. A recent study found that the average out-of-pocket cost
to the federal government of certain tort cases tried by jury is
$15,028-and this excludes the queueing costs.39 But the fee for
so See J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSmM COURT EXPENDI-
TURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES xviii, xix (Rand Inst. for Civ. Justice 1982).
[53:366
Summary Jury Trial and ADR
filing a case in federal district court is only $60.
More realistic filing fees would be a simpler as well as more
efficacious method of dealing with the caseload crisis than new
ways of inducing people to settle lawsuits before trial. A point
might be reached where it could be argued that filing fees for fed-
eral jury trials were so high as to impair civil litigants' rights under
the Seventh Amendment, but it would not be much of an argu-
ment so long as the fees did not exceed a reasonable estimate of
the social costs of such trials. Although court-annexed arbitration
has the effect of increasing the filing fees for small claims, it does
so in rather a sneaky fashion.
Even more important than the issue of the soundness of the
proposals discussed in this paper is the question whether judicial
administration should be an art or a science. More precisely,
should it remain exclusively an art, practiced by judges and judi-
cial administrators, or should it also have the elements of a science,
practiced by economists, statisticians, and other social scientists?
There is both a practical literature on judicial administration and a
theoretical literature illustrated by the present paper, but the
practical approach greatly predominates, and few policy changes in
the area of judicial administration have reflected the findings of
social scientists.
The imbalance seems to me unfortunate. Beginning with the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
accelerating with the caseload explosion that began around 1960,
the federal courts have been an arena of massive experimentation
in judicial administration. The milestones include liberalized class
actions, one-way attorney's fee shifting, expansive pretrial discov-
ery, managerial judging, the six-person jury, limited publication of
appellate opinions, greater use of judicial adjuncts, and now "alter-
native dispute resolution," illustrated by the summary jury trial
and court-annexed arbitration. Very few of these experiments have
been conceived or evaluated in a scientific spirit and this may help
explain why the federal courts remain in a state of crisis. Maybe a
dose of social science is the thing, or one of the things, that the
system needs.
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